Partition Obvious Preference and Mistrust in
Mechanism Design: Theory and Experiment
Luyao Zhang is a Ph.D. Candidate holding Presidential Fellowship at the Ohio State University, and her research is supported by the National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant. She has been striving to be a microeconomist with a broad theoretical and empirical overview, particularly, but not restricted to, decision theory, game theory, mechanism design, industrial organization, and experimental economics. She has an abiding passion for the formal modeling of bounded rationality and its applications. She is also keenly interested in transdisciplinary collaborations.
Substantial evidence in field, lab and thought experiments in multiple disciplines, shows that decision makers often choose a dominated strategy, which contradicts with current economic theory. To bridge this gap between theory and evidence, first, we propose two alternative axiomatic approaches, formalizing a distinct defect in human reasoning and tying together a broad range of evidence for the choice of dominated strategies. Second, we extend the theory to game theory and mechanism design, where we identify a rich class of mechanisms that successfully achieve desirable goals even with boundedly rational agents or agents who mistrust the market makers. Third, we test and verify our theory and its implications by a laboratory experiment. Finally, we address how our approach contributes to accomplishing two goals simultaneously in modeling bounded rationality: stimulating transdisciplinary conversations and providing a unified framework.
【讲座地点】：明斋315；Light lunch is prepared