Sustaining Cooperation with Multiple Relationships
程琛，美国西北大学(Northwestern University) 凯洛格商学院博士，美国约翰-霍普金斯大学(Johns Hopkins University)商学院助理教授。主要研究领域为微观经济理论、政治经济学和社会网络。研究发表于American Economic Journal: Microeconomics等期刊。
We study the sustaining of cooperation with multiple relationships on networks. That is, agents interact with each other on potentially more than one relationship. We examine the following two questions: First, given the network structure, how agents’ cooperating incentives will be affected by having multiple relationships, i.e., multiplexity; secondly, when we endogenize network formation, if an agent has one additional relationship to establish, will they choose to link with a current neighbor or a stranger, i.e., to multiplex or not? We provide the following theoretical predictions: 1) Agents have strong incentives to multiplex and may fall into a ``multiplexity trap’’. This could happen even when cooperating with strangers is more efficient. 2) Agents prefer multiplexing to linking with strangers when a society’s degree distribution is not too dispersed, or when it has a very dispersed degree distribution but exhibits positive assortivity. We also provide empirical evidence that supports our theoretical predictions.
【主 持 人】：谢丹夏 清华大学社科学院经济所助理教授